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RESTORATIVE JUSTICE FROM PROSECUTORS’ 
PERSPECTIVE 
Bruce A. Green* & Lara Bazelon** 
 
Restorative justice processes have been promoted as an alternative to 
criminal adjudication for many years outside the United States and, in recent 
years, in the United States as well.  In the United States, restorative justice 
processes are used in some jurisdictions in cases involving juvenile offenders 
or low-level, nonviolent offenses by adults, but they have rarely been used in 
cases of adult felony offenders charged with serious violent crimes.  Whether 
restorative justice processes will be used more broadly depends largely on 
whether prosecutors become receptive to their use.  A handful of newly 
elected “progressive prosecutors” have expressed interest in applying 
restorative justice processes in these and other kinds of felony cases 
involving adult defendants.  But conventional prosecutors generally remain 
uninterested in or hostile to restorative justice, even though most accept 
problem-solving courts and other alternatives to prosecution and 
incarceration.  This Article explores why mainstream U.S. prosecutors are 
disposed against restorative justice and suggests how their concerns might 
best be addressed by restorative justice proponents. 
INTRODUCTION 
On November 9, 2019, Chesa Boudin, a public defender and the son of 
incarcerated parents, was elected district attorney (DA) of San Francisco, 
California.1  Boudin ran on a progressive platform that included a promise 
that “[e]very victim who wants to participate in restorative justice will have 
the right to do so.”2  During the campaign, he spoke about the role that 
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Program, and the National Center for Access to Justice on November 1, 2019, at Fordham 
University School of Law. 
 
 1. Derek Hawkins, Progressive Lawyer Wins San Francisco District Attorney’s Race, 
Continuing National Reform Trend, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2019, 2:51 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/11/10/progressive-lawyer-wins-san-francisco-
district-attorney-race-continuing-national-reform-trend/ [https://perma.cc/L77D-RLXB]. 
 2. See Chesa Boudin’s Plan for a Survivor-Centered Approach to Harm, Using a 
Restorative Justice Program to End the Cycle of Incarceration Through Healing and 
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restorative justice had played in his own life.3  Noting that his parents’ crimes 
claimed many victims—two police officers and an armed guard were 
killed4—Boudin also pointed out that he, as their fourteen-month-old son, 
suffered from their sudden, prolonged absence from his life.5  His mother 
was not released until 2003, when Boudin was finishing college; his father 
remains in prison.6  “But restorative justice saved me,” he wrote, “and did 
more to rehabilitate my parents than any number of years in prison ever 
could.”7 
Boudin’s commitment to offer restorative justice to any victim who wants 
it, without placing limitations on the type of crime involved, builds on and 
broadens pledges made by other progressive prosecutors.  Eric Gonzalez was 
elected in 2017 to serve as the DA of Kings County, New York—which 
encompasses Brooklyn.8  His office has formed a partnership with Common 
Justice, a nonprofit that offers restorative justice as an alternative to jail and 
prison for young people ages sixteen to twenty-six charged with serious 
violent felonies that include robbery, assault, and attempted murder.9  
Danielle Sered, the executive director of Common Justice, stated that 
acceptance into the program is conditioned on the wishes of the victim.10  
Offenders enter a guilty plea at the outset of the case to an underlying 
misdemeanor.11  On successful completion of an intensive fifteen-month-
long program that includes facilitator-mediated dialogues with the victims or 
 
Accountability, CHESA BOUDIN, https://www.chesaboudin.com/restorative_justice [https:// 
perma.cc/PNW3-5SEH] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020). 
 3. John Nichols, Chesa Boudin Wants to Bring Restorative Justice to San Francisco, 
NATION (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/podcast/politics/chesa-boudin-san-
francisco/ [https://perma.cc/B4KU-QKUB]. 
 4. Dana Goodyear, How Far Will California Take Criminal-Justice Reform, NEW 
YORKER (Oct. 5, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/california-chronicles/how-far-
will-california-take-criminal-justice-reform [https://perma.cc/W2Y4-W2ZL].  In 1981, 
Boudin’s parents, Kathy Boudin and David Gilbert, drove the getaway car in a robbery 
planned by members of the Black Liberation Army (BLA)—a black power organization. Id.  
A guard was killed in the course of the robbery. Id.  When the vehicle Gilbert was driving was 
subsequently stopped by police, BLA members shot and killed two police officers. Id.  Both 
Boudin and Gilbert were convicted under New York’s felony murder rule. Id.  Boudin 
received a sentence of twenty years to life and was paroled in 2003. See id.  Gilbert, who 
received a sentence of seventy-five years to life, is still in prison. See id. 
 5. Chesa Boudin, San Francisco Deserves Restorative Justice, APPEAL (Aug. 30, 2019), 
https://theappeal.org/san-francisco-restorative-justice/ [https://perma.cc/XW7E-Q5LH]. 
 6. See Goodyear, supra note 4. 
 7. See Boudin, supra note 5. 
 8. Gonzalez Cruises to Landslide Win in DA Race, KINGS COUNTY POL. (Sept. 13, 2017), 
https://www.kingscountypolitics.com/gonzalez-cruises-landslide-win-da-race/ [https:// 
perma.cc/N6FY-78GW]. 
 9. Adam Wisnieski, Offender Meets Victim:  A “Survivor-Centered” Approach to 
Violent Crime, CRIME REP. (Apr. 12, 2017), https://thecrimereport.org/2017/04/12/offender-
meets-victim-a-survivor-centered-approach-to-violent-crime/ [https://perma.cc/Q7SG-
5FMX]. 
 10. DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON:  VIOLENCE, MASS INCARCERATION, AND A ROAD 
TO REPAIR 42–43 (2019). 
 11. Telephone Interview with Danielle Sered, Exec. Dir., Common Justice (Nov. 27, 
2019). 
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surrogate victims, the felony charge is dismissed.12  Common Justice serves 
approximately twenty-five offenders each year and is expected to expand to 
reach forty to fifty people in 2020.13 
Restorative justice is also gaining traction in rural jurisdictions that are less 
racially and ethnically diverse.  In 2019, Natasha Irving, a criminal defense 
lawyer, was elected to serve as DA of Maine’s District Six.14  As DA, she 
oversees four counties with a combined population of less than 150,000 
people, and she won after pledging to broaden the use of restorative justice.15  
Prior to Irving’s election, restorative practices were employed in District Six 
principally in cases involving juveniles and young adults.16  She promised to 
“implement a system of community-based restorative justice for [adults’] 
nonviolent misdemeanor offenses.”17  Irving explained: 
Community-based restorative justice, it holds the offender accountable, 
makes the victim whole, keeps our community safe, and it costs less in 
taxpayer dollars than the system we are using now, which is “lock em’ up.”  
Lock them up for any nonviolent offense that we can get jail time for.18 
In the past few years, other candidates who are part of the progressive 
prosecution movement19 have taken a page from a guidebook for twenty-
first-century prosecutors, which lists restorative justice among its twenty-one 
principles.20 
Although restorative justice processes vary and are employed in varying 
contexts, the basic aims are (1) to promote a mediated discussion between an 
offender and victim; (2) to give the victim an opportunity to explain the 
impact of the offense; (3) to give the offender a chance to apologize and 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id.  In Cook County, Illinois, Kim Foxx, who ran and won on a progressive platform, 
offers a program called Balanced and Restorative Justice, which offers restorative justice 
alternatives to juveniles at varying stages of the process, including pre- and postcharging or 
following a guilty plea but prior to sentencing. Putting Balanced and Restorative Justice into 
Practice, COOK COUNTY STATE’S ATT’Y, https://www.cookcountystatesattorney.org/outreach/ 
putting-balanced-and-restorative-justice-practice [https://perma.cc/P8C3-NXLH] (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2020). 
 14. Beth Brogan, How a New District Attorney Is Shaking Up the Justice System in 
Midcoast Maine, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (May 28, 2019, 1:03 AM), 
https://bangordailynews.com/2019/05/28/news/midcoast/how-a-new-district-attorney-is-
shaking-up-the-justice-system-in-midcoast-maine/ [https://perma.cc/PTB6-SCYB]. 
 15. See id. 
 16. Abigail Curtis, What Separates Candidates Running for District Attorney in Four 
Coastal Maine Counties, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Nov. 1, 2018, 11:07 AM), 
https://bangordailynews.com/2018/11/01/politics/what-separates-candidates-running-for-
district-attorney-in-four-coastal-maine-counties/ [https://perma.cc/3VRK-5YEJ]. 
 17. Jessica Picard, DA Candidate Focuses on Restorative Justice, LINCOLN COUNTY NEWS 
(Sept. 10, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://lcnme.com/currentnews/da-candidate-focuses-on-
restorative-justice/ [https://perma.cc/9UN2-BMXN] (quoting Natasha Irving). 
 18. Id. (quoting Natasha Irving). 
 19. See generally Jeffrey Bellin, Defending Progressive Prosecution, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. (forthcoming 2020); Angela J. Davis, Reimagining Prosecution:  A Growing Progressive 
Movement, 3 UCLA CRIM. JUST. L. REV. 1 (2019). 
 20. FAIR & JUST PROSECUTION ET AL., 21 PRINCIPLES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY PROSECUTOR 
12–13 (2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/FJP_21 
Principles_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/R626-D4WC]. 
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reckon with the root causes of the offending behavior; and (4) to develop and 
then implement a plan to repair the harm and make amends.21  The process 
aims to be restorative in two respects—both to restore the offender to the 
community and to restore the victim’s well-being.  Restorative justice, which 
has deep historical roots in indigenous cultures,22 has been increasingly 
employed in the United States in schools and juvenile justice proceedings.23  
Outside the United States, restorative justice processes have been used more 
widely as an alternative to criminal prosecution where the victim and 
offender are both amenable.24  There is a substantial literature documenting 
its use with criminal offenders outside the United States,25 and the prevailing 
view is that restorative justice programs lead to lower rates of recidivism and 
higher rates of victim satisfaction than criminal prosecutions and 
punishment.26 
In the United States, however, restorative justice has gained much less 
traction outside the small circle of progressive prosecutors.  Even then, its 
use is often limited to juvenile offenses or nonviolent, low-level felonies 
committed by adults.  One substantial reason is that, in most U.S. 
jurisdictions, restorative justice processes cannot be employed as an 
alternative to criminal prosecution without the assent of the prosecutor, and 
conventional U.S. prosecutors, unlike their few progressive counterparts, are 
generally skeptical, if not hostile, to restorative justice.  This Article asks 
why.  As background, Part I describes the role that restorative justice 
 
 21. HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENS:  A NEW FOCUS FOR CRIME AND JUSTICE 21 (5th ed. 
1990); Shailly Agnihotri & Cassie Veach, Reclaiming Restorative Justice:  An Alternative 
Paradigm for Justice, 20 CUNY L. REV 323, 326–29 (2017). 
 22. Restorative justice practices are said to originate in Native American peace circles and 
in indigenous Maori practices. Patrick Glen Drake, Comment, Victim-Offender Mediation in 
Texas:  When “Eye for Eye” Becomes “Eye to Eye,” 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 647, 656 (2006); see 
also Barton Poulson, A Third Voice:  A Review of Empirical Research on Psychological 
Outcomes of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 167, 167–68.  For an overview of how 
restorative justice practices developed in the United States from the 1970s to the 2000s, see 
Amy J. Cohen, Moral Restorative Justice:  A Political Genealogy of Activism and 
Neoliberalism in the United States, 104 MINN. L. REV. 889, 895–931 (2019). 
 23. Sara S. Beale, Still Tough on Crime?:  Prospects for Restorative Justice in the United 
States, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 413, 421. 
 24. Heather Strang & Lawrence W. Sherman, Repairing the Harm:  Victims and 
Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 15, 18.  See generally Mark S. Umbreit et al., The 
Impact of Victim-Offender Mediation:  Two Decades of Research, FED. PROB., Dec. 2001, at 
29. 
 25. See, e.g., ROSS LONDON, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE:  FROM THE 
MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM (2011 ed.); RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
(Linda Gröning & Jørn Jacobsen eds., 2012); HEATHER STRANG, REPAIR OR REVENGE:  
VICTIMS AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (2002). 
 26. See Telephone Interview with Sujatha Baliga, Dir., Restorative Justice Project, and 
Alex Busansky, President & Founder, Impact Justice (Nov. 26, 2019) (describing a small 
restorative justice project for juvenile offenders undertaken by their organization, Impact 
Justice, the nonprofit Community Works, and the San Francisco DA’s office and stating that 
juveniles who participated in the program had a 13 percent recidivism rate as opposed to a 53 
percent recidivism rate for individuals placed in the control group); see also SERED, supra note 
10, at 134 (stating that the recidivism rate for participants in the Common Justice program is 
less than 6 percent). 
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processes serve in some jurisdictions as an alternative to criminal prosecution 
and punishment, as well as prosecutors’ crucial role in determining whether 
to divert cases to restorative justice processes.  Part II identifies and 
comments on various reasons why conventional prosecutors might be 
skeptical of, if not hostile to, restorative justice processes.  Finally, Part III 
argues that prosecutors’ skepticism is unwarranted and that prosecutors 
should be open to the use of restorative justice processes as an alternative 
that, in many cases, will better serve the public interest in reducing recidivism 
and, as the authors have argued previously, better serve the interests of the 
crime victim.27 
I.  BACKGROUND 
The ordinary work of U.S. prosecutors involves criminal prosecutions.  
The Constitution prescribes trial as the process for adjudicating guilt or 
innocence, although, as the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, plea 
bargaining has become the customary way in which criminal cases are 
resolved.28  In the adjudicative process, prosecutors make the initial decision 
whether to initiate criminal charges against individuals who are suspected of 
having committed a crime.  After filing charges, prosecutors take a small 
number of cases to trial and obtain guilty pleas in most of the rest, often as a 
result of a plea bargain.  Some small number of prosecutions are dropped, 
dismissed, or end in acquittals.  Successful prosecutions culminate in 
criminal convictions and the imposition of punishment, which often involves 
incarceration.  The objectives of criminal punishment include incapacitating 
dangerous offenders,29 deterring future wrongdoers,30 securing retribution,31 
reinforcing the societal norms expressed in the criminal law,32 and 
rehabilitating offenders, although, in practice, prosecution and imprisonment 
do little to rehabilitate offenders and may be counterproductive.33 
 
 27. Lara Bazelon & Bruce A. Green, Victims’ Rights from a Restorative Perspective, 17 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2020). 
 28. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012). 
 29. See, e.g., United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 999 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(observing that “incarceration to protect society from a person’s future criminal conduct . . . 
achieves one of the classic purposes of punishment—incapacitation”). 
 30. See, e.g., United States v. Barker, 771 F.2d 1362, 1368 (9th Cir. 1985) (observing that 
“perhaps paramount among the purposes of punishment is the desire to deter similar 
misconduct by others” and that “[t]his doctrine, commonly called ‘general deterrence,’ boasts 
an impressive lineage, was long-recognized at common law, and continues to command ‘near 
unanimity . . . among state and federal jurists’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 499 (S.D.N.Y 1976))). 
 31. See, e.g., Leo Zaibert, The Instruments of Abolition, or Why Retributivism Is the Only 
Real Justification of Punishment, 32 LAW & PHIL. 33 (2013). 
 32. See, e.g., Graham v. State, 440 P.3d 309, 324 (Alaska Ct. App. 2019) (stating that 
under the state constitution, retribution is not a legitimate purpose of punishment but the 
legitimate aims of sentencing include “uphold[ing] legal and moral standards by ensuring that 
people who commit serious crimes will normally receive substantial sentences”). 
 33. A recent article on the parole process in New York eloquently observed how criminal 
adjudication and incarceration do not facilitate offenders’ rehabilitation and restoration but, if 
anything, undermine it: 
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It is prosecutors’ work processing criminal cases in judicial proceedings 
that defines our expectations of them.  In particular, it gives rise to our 
understanding of their distinctive professional role and responsibilities, 
which are encapsulated in the concept of a duty to “seek justice.”34  Courts, 
bar associations, and academics have elaborated on the expectations implicit 
in, or arising from, the duty to seek justice.35  At minimum, prosecutors are 
expected to “convict the guilty”—or, at least, some percentage of the guilty—
but to avoid prosecuting or punishing the innocent,36 and they are expected 
to avoid bringing excessively severe charges37 and to promote the fairness of 
the process in which charges are pursued.38  Prosecutors in the United States 
are expected to “exercis[e] discretion to not pursue criminal charges in 
appropriate circumstances,”39 including in some circumstances where the 
prosecutor is certain of the offender’s guilt and of the ability to obtain a 
conviction but believes that a criminal prosecution would be an unwise or 
unnecessary expenditure of resources or that a criminal conviction would be 
disproportionately harsh.40 
 
There is no official mechanism to require people confined in New York’s prisons to 
confront their guilt, to grapple with questions of remorse and responsibility, to think 
about how they might make amends to a victim’s family.  At times, the legal system 
even seems to work against these goals; at trial, defense attorneys typically 
downplay the defendant’s culpability—or deny his guilt altogether—in an effort to 
minimize his punishment.  Often, a defendant, long after he is convicted, will cling 
to the narrative of his crime that his lawyer told in court. 
Jennifer Gonnerman, Prepping for Parole, NEW YORKER (Nov. 15, 2019), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/12/02/prepping-for-parole [https://perma.cc/ 
2DPP-YKYB]. 
 34. Russell M. Gold, “Clientless” Lawyers, 92 WASH. L. REV. 87, 95–96 (2017) (“The 
duty to do justice entails ‘specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural 
justice’ and that the defendant is treated fairly.  It requires prosecutors to ‘think about the 
delivery of criminal justice on a systemic level’ rather than focusing only on seeking 
individual convictions.” (footnotes omitted) (first quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983); then quoting R. Michael Cassidy, (Ad)ministering Justice:  
A Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to Support Sentencing Reform, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 981, 983 
(2014))). 
 35. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 36. Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice:  Can 
Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 50 (1991) (stating that “the heart of the codes’ 
mandate to do justice seems clear:  the prosecutor should exercise discretion so as to prosecute 
only persons she truly considers guilty”). 
 37. Stephanos Bibas, Rewarding Prosecutors for Performance, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
441, 444 (2009) (suggesting performance reviews as a way of mitigating against the potential 
for prosecutors to behave unethically by pursuing “excessive charges”). 
 38. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1098 
(1988) (stating that the onus is on the lawyer to “take reasonable actions” to rectify procedural 
defects in the adversarial system). 
 39. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(b) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2017). 
 40. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Discretion:  The Difficulty and Necessity of 
Public Inquiry, 123 DICK. L. REV. 589, 591 (2019) (observing that “[f]ifty years ago, . . . 
prosecutors only selectively prosecuted ‘bad check’ cases,” because creditors principally 
sought restitution and were unwilling to assist in prosecutions even if restitution was not 
made).  In cases involving regulatory offenses that could be successfully prosecuted, because 
they involve willful misconduct, white-collar prosecutors often defer to civil regulatory 
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Conventionally, the prosecutor’s choice was between triggering the 
criminal trial process by filing charges or doing nothing.  Over time, 
however, prosecutors’ options expanded.  First, it became increasingly 
common for prosecutors to divert low-level offenses out of the “charge-
conviction-sentence” pipeline.41  Diversion programs vary in their 
particulars, but the outcome is an agreement not to prosecute or a dismissal 
of filed charges on the condition that the offender fulfill specified terms of 
an agreement.42  Typical terms in diversion cases include those that a court 
might itself impose as conditions of probation, such as that the offender, 
while staying clean, get vocational training, complete his or her high school 
or college education, and/or successfully complete a drug rehabilitation 
program.  But because the terms were a matter of contract, they were not 
limited to conditions that a court could impose, which gave both sides 
flexibility.43 
The alternatives to a prosecution, conviction, and judicial sentencing 
expanded in the past two decades with the development of specialized or 
problem-solving courts.  Most widespread and well accepted of the 
specialized courts are drug courts, in which judges offer drug offenders the 
option of drug treatment as an alternative to a conviction and/or a sentence 
of incarceration.44  Others include community courts, young adult courts, 
mental health courts, and veterans’ courts.45  They function as an alternative 
 
authorities.  For example, the overwhelming majority of tax crimes are not prosecuted; rather, 
prosecutors leave it to civil tax authorities to decide whether to bring civil proceedings.  
Increasingly, rather than making no-prosecution decisions on an ad hoc basis or based 
exclusively on nonpublic policies, prosecutors have begun publicly to announce policies not 
to prosecute certain low-level crimes.  For a discussion of possible legal challenges to such 
policies, see John E. Foster, Note, Charges to Be Declined:  Legal Challenges and Policy 
Debates Surrounding Non-prosecution Initiatives in Massachusetts, 60 B.C. L. REV. 2511 
(2019). 
 41. Anthony V. Alfieri, Community Prosecutors, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1465, 1473 (2002). 
 42. See generally Amanda Jacinto, Redefining Wins and Losses:  Further Enhancing the 
Prosecutor Playbook, PROSECUTOR, Apr. 2018, at 10. 
 43. Curtis E. A. Karnow, Setting Bail for Public Safety, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 26 
(2008) (“Prosecutors have enormous flexibility in amending charges to enable a wide variety 
of enticing plea bargains, by, for example, offering a pretrial diversion program or probation 
where it might not have been otherwise available, or allowing the defendant to avoid some 
mandatory sentence or condition of probation.”). 
 44. Drug courts are widespread and well accepted.  They began as an innovation in Miami 
and, by 2010, there were more than 2500 drug court programs in the United States. 
Such treatment courts give offenders incentive to succeed in addiction treatment to 
avoid prison and cast judges in the rehabilitative role, as providers of ‘tough love’ 
and cheerleaders toward success. . . .  [P]rosecutors and defense counsel occupy a 
less adversarial and reduced role as part of a team working toward the subject’s 
recovery. 
Mary Fan, Street Diversion and Decarceration, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 179 (2013).  
Studies show lower rates of drug relapse and reoffending for those participating in drug courts 
and that, factoring in the lower recidivism rate and the cost of prison, they cost the public less 
than the traditional process. Id. at 179–80.  But see generally Erin R. Collins, The Problem of 
Problem-Solving Courts (Nov. 22, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (questioning the empirical 
data supporting the efficacy of drug courts and noting the paucity of data to support the 
efficacy of other problem-solving courts). 
 45. Collins, supra note 44 (manuscript at 1) (listing and defining problem-solving courts). 
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to criminal adjudicatory proceedings or to incarceration after conviction.  
Designed for low-level offenders, these courts typically involve treatment, 
counseling, or education, not punishment.46  Practices vary.  Successful 
completion of a problem-solving court program may involve a decision not 
to bring criminal charges, the dismissal of charges, or the expungement of a 
conviction.47  In some jurisdictions, though not all, an offender’s eligibility 
to be processed in a problem-solving or specialized court, or to enter a 
diversion program, requires the prosecutor’s agreement.48 
Restorative justice processes may be employed at any point in the course 
of a criminal prosecution—for example, following a conviction but before 
sentencing,49 as part of a criminal sentence,50 or after a defendant is 
convicted and imprisoned51—but our focus is on their use as a diversion 
program.52  In Vermont, restorative justice as an alternative or adjunct to 
prosecution has been part of state policy for the past two decades.53  In 2018, 
after finding that restorative justice processes were being used successfully 
 
 46. Jami Vigil, Building a Culturally Competent Problem-Solving Court, COLO. LAW., 
Apr. 2016, at 51, 51 (“While no two problem-solving court programs are identical, all rest on 
a foundation of therapeutic jurisprudence, which is the premise that law is a social force that 
can have either a therapeutic or an anti-therapeutic impact within the lives of individuals, 
families, and communities.  Through its use of individualized treatment, community-based 
incentives, creative or therapeutic sanctions, trauma-informed practices, and the judicial 
officer as an educator, the highly trained and multidisciplinary treatment team works together 
to further recovery and rehabilitation for program participants.”). 
 47. See generally SUZANNE M. STRONG ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF 
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS, 2012 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpsc12.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T2WW-N34P]. 
 48. Id. 
 49. A program run by a federal district court in Boston called RISE has offered a diversion 
program for serious, nonviolent felonies since 2015.  The sentencing judge takes the offender’s 
successful completion of the RISE program into account at sentencing.  Many defendants who 
have been through RISE and who were facing prison were sentenced to probation instead. 
Allyson Lorimer Crews & Maria V. D’Addieco, U.S. Dist. Court Dist. of Mass., Repair, 
Invest, Succeed, Emerge, INT’L INST. FOR RESTORATIVE PRACTICES, https:// 
www.iirp.edu/images/HThFgH_IIRP_Presentation.pdf [https://perma.cc/5U7W-G4Y5] (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2020). 
 50. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 558.019(8) (2020) (“Courts shall retain discretion to lower 
or exceed the sentence recommended by the commission as otherwise allowable by law, and 
to order restorative justice methods, when applicable.”). 
 51. The Redemption Project with Van Jones, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/shows/ 
redemption-project-van-jones [https://perma.cc/6V6A-HG6U]. (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).  
For an account of how restorative justice processes are being used to bring crime victims 
together with individuals who have been convicted and incarcerated but eventually exonerated 
and released, see LARA BAZELON, RECTIFY:  THE POWER OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AFTER 
WRONGFUL CONVICTION 156–208 (2018). 
 52. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-274(3)(a) (2020) (declaring that, for specified juvenile 
offenders, “the county attorney or city attorney may utilize restorative justice practices or 
services as a form of, or condition of, diversion or plea bargaining or as a recommendation as 
a condition of disposition, through a referral to a restorative justice facilitator”). 
 53. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 2a(a) (2020) (“It is the policy of this State that principles of 
restorative justice be included in shaping how the criminal justice system responds to persons 
charged with or convicted of criminal offenses.”). 
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in various other cases,54 Vermont established a study committee to examine 
whether restorative justice could be used “in domestic and sexual violence 
and stalking cases.”55  In various other jurisdictions, independently of state 
legislation, prosecutors have voluntarily collaborated with social service 
agencies to divert some cases to restorative justice processes.  In 2019, 
Danielle Sered published a book describing a number of serious violent 
felony cases in Brooklyn, New York, that were successfully resolved using a 
restorative justice program offered by her nonprofit, Common Justice, in 
partnership with the Kings County DA.56  Proponents of restorative justice 
in the United States point to Sered’s program and others as examples of the 
ways in which restorative justice has the potential to obtain better 
outcomes—such as reduced recidivism, increased public safety, and higher 
rates of victim satisfaction—than the traditional adversarial approach.57  But 
nationally, restorative justice processes remain little known to the public and 
are not prominent in discussions of criminal justice policy. 
In general, U.S. prosecutors control the charging process, and therefore 
restorative justice cannot be used as an alternative to the adjudicative process 
without prosecutors’ assent.  In other words, the decision whether to divert a 
case to an agency that administers a restorative justice process, like the 
charging decision generally, is ordinarily a matter of prosecutorial discretion.  
When candidates pledge to employ restorative justice, they are almost always 
promising to exercise discretion not to charge and/or not to incarcerate 
offenders who, with the victim’s willing participation, successfully undergo 
this process.  It remains to be seen how effectively recently elected 
progressive prosecutors will implement their pledges. 
Needless to say, a promise to pursue restorative justice as an alternative to 
prosecution and imprisonment is a stark departure from the “tough on crime” 
rhetorical stance that dominated prosecutors’ discourse for more than a 
quarter century and that continues to be exemplified by U.S. Attorney 
General William Barr, among others.58  As an advocate for restorative 
 
 54. 2018 Vt. Acts & Resolves 2555 (“Restorative justice has proven to be very helpful in 
reducing offender recidivism, and, in many cases, has resulted in positive outcomes for 
victims. . . .  Victims thrive when they have options.  Because the criminal justice system does 
not always meet victims’ needs, restorative justice may provide options to improve victims’ 
outcomes.”). 
 55. Id. 
 56. SERED, supra note 10, at 17–49. 
 57. See, e.g., FAIR & JUST PROSECUTION ET AL., supra note 20, at 12 (“Research shows 
that crime victims often do not feel that prosecution and sentencing serve them well; 
restorative justice can help address their concerns.  These programs also have a consistent 
track record of achieving lower rates of recidivism than traditional penalties, including for 
serious offenses.”). 
 58. For example, in a speech before the Fraternal Order of Police on August 12, 2019, 
Barr attacked progressive prosecutors, asserting without any evidence in support:   
Once in office, they have been announcing their refusal to enforce broad swaths of 
the criminal law.  Some are refusing to prosecute various theft cases and drug cases.  
And when they do deign to charge a criminal suspect, they are frequently seeking 
sentences that are pathetically lenient.  So, these cities are headed back to the days 
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justice, Danielle Sered acknowledges the importance of electing progressive 
prosecutors who are exercising discretion less punitively than their 
predecessors.59  But her focus, and that of other restorative justice advocates, 
is on trying to win over communities and, ultimately, state legislatures60 on 
the apparent assumption that the overwhelming majority of prosecutors can 
never be convinced to support restorative justice processes. 
In the next Part of this Article, we turn to the possible reasons for 
conventional prosecutors’ skepticism, of which there are many. 
II.  CONVENTIONAL PROSECUTORS’ PREDISPOSITION AGAINST 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
Although restorative justice has become a campaign plank for a handful of 
would-be progressive prosecutors, it has not caught on among more 
traditional prosecutors as a potential diversionary strategy, especially not as 
a strategy for dealing with serious wrongdoing.61  One can posit various 
reasons for this, not all of which reflect prosecutors’ hostility.  Even for the 
most progressive prosecutors, the office’s bread and butter will be processing 
cases through the criminal adjudication process:  few advocates outside the 
prison abolition movement62 propose using restorative justice to replace 
prosecution, trials, and plea bargaining as the conventional processes for 
 
of revolving door justice.  The results will be predictable.  More crime; more 
victims.  
William R. Kelly, Attorney General Barr Got It Wrong, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Aug. 13, 2019), 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/crime-and-punishment/201908/attorney-general-
barr-got-it-wrong [https://perma.cc/P9BH-FEX9] (quoting U.S. Attorney General Barr) 
(responding to Barr by indicating that progressive prosecutors’ “primary goal is to enhance 
public safety by implementing smart, evidence-based policies for reducing crime, recidivism, 
and victimization” and that, “[t]o say that these prosecutors are anti-law enforcement and that 
their policies will result in more crime and more victimization simply shows how ill-informed 
Barr is regarding crime and criminal justice”). 
 59. See SERED, supra note 10, at 162–66. 
 60. Id. 
 61. In a recent article showing how restorative justice may appeal in different ways to 
individuals and institutions with sharply divergent political and ideological visions, Amy 
Cohen observed that restorative justice “in the United States . . . has only ever limped along 
at the margins of the criminal justice system” but that, while originating “primarily . . . on the 
political left,” it “is gaining supporters on the political right” and “is also increasingly 
promoted from within state institutions.” Cohen, supra note 22, at 891–93.  Cohen makes 
reference to a compilation of state laws showing that “between 2010 and 2015, fifteen states 
enacted or updated restorative justice statutes.” Id. at 893 (citing SHANNON M. SLIVA, 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE LEGISLATIVE TRENDS 1–2 (2015), https://www.rjcolorado.org/ 
_literature_153668/Restorative_Justice_Legislation_Trends [https://perma.cc/PN6V-
WBJF]).  According to the compilation, during that six-year period, eight of the new laws 
supported restorative justice as a diversionary approach principally for juvenile offenders or 
nonviolent first-time offenders, eight laws established restorative justice as an “intermediate 
sanction” along with or in lieu of other penalties, four laws related to school discipline, three 
laws supported restorative justice as a postconviction or reentry strategy for convicted 
defendants, and two laws simply added to or updated the statutory definition of restorative 
justice. 
 62. See John Washington, What Is Prison Abolition?, NATION (July 31, 2018), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/what-is-prison-abolition/ [https://perma.cc/E2HE-
6QF3]. 
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addressing criminal offenses.63  To go beyond the conventional role requires 
resources, and restorative justice is resource intensive:  the prosecutor must 
team up with a social service agency capable of administering a restorative 
justice program and hire attorneys or other staff within the office to 
coordinate and help administer it, a process that involves everything from 
selection criteria to case monitoring to data collection to assessing 
outcomes.64  It is far less costly to negotiate nonprosecution and deferred 
prosecution agreements containing other conditions and restrictions.  Unless 
the prosecutor has received state or private funding to support a restorative 
justice program, as some have,65 such a program may not seem feasible even 
if the prosecutor is enthusiastic. 
Further, even prosecutors who are otherwise receptive to exploring 
alternatives to prosecution and incarceration may be hesitant because 
restorative justice processes are largely unproven; this is particularly true 
when it comes to measuring recidivism over the long term, which is of great 
import to ensuring public safety.66  Although there is program-specific data 
indicating that restorative justice processes are generally more effective than 
the traditional adjudicative process in reducing recidivism and promoting 
victim satisfaction, the sample sizes are often small, the comparison groups 
are not uniform, and, because many of these programs are relatively new, 
 
 63. See Mary E. Reimund, The Law and Restorative Justice:  Friend or Foe?:  A Systemic 
Look at the Legal Issues in Restorative Justice, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 667, 671–72 (2005) 
(contrasting some advocates’ “dream” that criminal justice will become predominantly 
restorative with other advocates’ more realistic conception of restorative justice as “another 
tool in the toolbox of options”). 
 64. The tough-on-crime alternative is much less costly. See Juleyka Lantigua-Williams, 
Are Prosecutors the Key to Justice Reform?, ATLANTIC (May 18, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/are-prosecutors-the-key-to-justice-
reform/483252/ [https://perma.cc/MWH2-G5RP] (“District attorneys do, however, have an 
incentive to prosecute and send people to state prison—because state prisons do not spend 
local county resources, so district attorneys’ budgets stay intact.”). 
 65. In 2019, the California legislature passed Senate Bill 678, which mandates that the 
Board of State and Community Corrections establish a “restorative justice pilot program.” See 
S. 678, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).  Following appropriation of funds by the legislature, 
the board must award five-year multimillion-dollar grants to three counties to establish 
programs in which the offender’s sentence is held in abeyance for thirty-six months while the 
offender undergoes counseling and a restorative justice program. See id.  The recipient 
counties are required to collect data on the effectiveness of the program and write a report 
documenting its findings. See id.  California’s governor allocated $25 million in the state’s 
budget for 2020 to fund these programs. Gov. Newsom Releases May Budget Revise, CAL. 
CATHOLIC CONF. (May 16, 2019), https://www.cacatholic.org/gov-newsom-releases-may-
budget-revise [https://perma.cc/YY6X-EH4P].  The San Joaquin County DA’s office, headed 
by Tori Verber Salazar, was the first to receive a grant. Rich Ibarra, State Funds Restorative 
Justice Pilot Program in San Joaquin County, CAP. PUB. RADIO (July 10, 2019), 
https://www.capradio.org/articles/2019/07/10/state-funds-restorative-justice-pilot-program-
in-san-joaquin-county/ [https://perma.cc/C2CL-GXR5]; see also Reimund, supra note 63, at 
674–75 (describing a program instituted by a Milwaukee prosecutor, with legislative funding, 
for nonviolent offenders who admitted wrongdoing). 
 66. Paul H. Robinson, The Virtues of Restorative Justice Processes, the Vices of 
“Restorative Justice,” 2003 UTAH L. REV. 375, 377–78 & n.7 (noting the “real risk” that the 
use of restorative justice in lieu of traditional prosecution “will not work” and expressing 
doubt that it will be sufficiently punitive to deter and to render “just deserts”). 
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longitudinal data is hard to come by.67  Even in juvenile settings, where it is 
used more commonly, research into the efficacy of restorative justice is 
positive but perhaps not conclusive.68  Precisely because restorative justice 
has not gained a foothold in the United States, there remains much to learn 
about how to run restorative justice programs most effectively, which 
programs are most effective in which circumstances, and whether, at their 
best, these programs achieve the proclaimed benefits. 
The limited empirical data might be taken as a reason for experimentation 
and study rather than for rejecting restorative justice out of hand.  But our 
intuition is that many of the country’s more than 2300 elected prosecutors 
would reflexively reject restorative justice as a potential alternative to 
prosecution in general, and most especially in felony cases.  In this Part, we 
identify two sets of reasons why traditional prosecutors might be skeptical, 
if not hostile, to restorative justice:  Part II.A discusses philosophical 
preferences for resolving cases through adjudication and punishment; Part 
II.B discusses relevant issues of power and control, as well as political and 
practical considerations.  Resistance from mainstream prosecutors is deeply 
ingrained and therefore may be hard to overcome even if more funding and 
more positive data emerge. 
A.  Philosophical Preferences for Adjudication and Punishment 
Discussions of restorative justice take place in the context of a broader 
debate about criminal justice reform.  Proponents of restorative justice tend 
to believe that the conventional “retributivist” or “carceral” process is 
deficient because it is overly punitive, criminogenic, and retraumatizing 
rather than healing for victims.69  Restorative justice processes are thought 
to be better in some cases, especially when incapacitation is not necessary to 
 
 67. See Poulson, supra note 22, at 169, 198–99 (documenting the results of seven studies 
using data from programs in the United States, Canada, England, and Australia and concluding 
that restorative justice outperformed traditional adjudicatory processes under every metric but 
noting that his analysis “relied exclusively on a limited number of quantitative indicators of 
success and failure in administering justice” and that consistent longitudinal data was lacking). 
 68. See, e.g., DAVID B. WILSON ET AL., NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV., 
EFFECTIVENESS OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE PRINCIPLES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE:  A META-ANALYSIS 
2 (2017), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/grants/250872.pdf [https://perma.cc/LTL2-
7S7W] (concluding from a review of studies that “[o]verall, the results evaluating restorative 
justice programs and practices showed a moderate reduction in future delinquent behavior 
relative to more traditional juvenile court processing”); id. at 6 (“Victims have improved 
perceptions of fairness, greater satisfaction, improved attitudes toward the juvenile offender, 
are more willing to forgive the offender, and are more likely to feel that the outcome was just 
than victims of youth processed by the traditional juvenile justice system.  Outcomes related 
to emotional well-being, however, did not indicate any consistent improvement for the 
restorative justice participants (youth or victims) relative to the traditional juvenile justice 
system processing.”). 
 69. See, e.g., MELISSA LEWIS & LES MCCRIMMON, THE ROLE OF ADR PROCESSES IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM:  A VIEW FROM AUSTRALIA 2 (2005), https://www.justice.gov.za/ 
alraesa/conferences/2005uganda/ent_s3_mccrimmon.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG2B-2V7L]; 
Avila Stahlman, Note, Restorative Justice in the Context of Intimate Partner Violence:  
Suggestions for Its Qualified Use as Supplementary to the Criminal Justice System, 28 U. FLA. 
J.L. PUB. POL’Y 193, 197–98 (2017) (discussing the downfalls of a retributivist approach). 
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protect the public from a dangerous offender.  But conventional prosecutors, 
especially those who have spent the better part of their legal careers trying 
cases in criminal court, are likely to be unconvinced either that the 
adjudicative process is generally deficient or that restorative justice is 
generally preferable. 
To begin with, conventional prosecutors are likely to be philosophically 
committed to the concept of delivering justice via trial or plea followed by 
punishment—the constitutionally prescribed response to criminal offenses, 
once proven.  Whether or not punishment involves incarceration, it is 
assumed to achieve objectives that restorative justice processes are not 
intended to achieve.  This is true even in cases of offenders who are not 
dangerous to the public, so that there is no need for incapacitation in order to 
ensure public safety.  But it is particularly true in cases of violent crime, 
which has traditionally called for a carceral response. While restorative 
justice claims other advantages, traditional prosecutors may not see them as 
adequate to compensate for its limitations.70 
First, criminal punishment serves an expressive function; the court’s 
public imposition of punishment, which at minimum, entails a moral stigma, 
publicly reaffirms the societal norms underlying the criminal law that the 
offender is sentenced for violating.  Restorative justice processes do not 
achieve this because they do not occur in public proceedings.  While the 
process may result in the offender’s public acknowledgement of wrongdoing, 
that is not invariably the resolution. 
Second, punishment is assumed to better serve the public interest in 
deterring future criminal wrongdoing precisely because it entails public 
shaming and the infliction of pain, typically through the loss of liberty.  While 
restorative justice processes may culminate in undertakings and insights that 
better promote the particular offender’s rehabilitation and therefore better 
protect the public from that one offender, no one plausibly claims that the 
fear of restorative justice effectively deters other wrongdoers. 
Third, punishment serves retributivist interests, which restorative justice 
does not.71  In part, the assumption is that retribution serves the victim.  But 
that cannot be the principal reason to favor punishment over restorative 
justice, since, in cases where victims are offered the alternative and opt for a 
restorative justice process, the particular victims either do not want 
retribution at all, would prefer the outcome offered by restorative justice, or 
do not want to undergo the process of adjudication necessary to obtain 
 
 70. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 66, at 378 n.7 (discussing an example of a restorative 
justice response to a violent stabbing in New Zealand in which the outcome called for the 
offender to pay NZ$15,000 for the victim’s surgery and perform 200 hours of community 
service and characterizing it as “anti-justice” because “such a sanction hardly reflects the 
extent of punishment the offender deserves for so vicious an attack”). 
 71. See generally Donald H. J. Herman, Restorative Justice and Retributive Justice:  An 
Opportunity for Cooperation or an Occasion for Conflict in the Search for Justice, 16 SEATTLE 
J. SOC. JUST. 71, 101 (2017) (describing the traditional view that restorative justice is 
inconsistent with retributive justice but arguing that they can be reconciled if restorative justice 
is accompanied by punishment that is “humane and rehabilitative”). 
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retribution by way of punishment.  Rather, the public at large is thought to 
have an interest in retribution and prosecutors are charged with representing 
the larger community.72  Regardless of what the victim wants or prefers, this 
interest may be thought to justify punishment but not restorative justice:  the 
public sense of justice is served and its moral outrage at the violation of 
societal norms is mollified when offenders get their “just deserts,” but not 
when offenders undeservedly escape punishment.  That may be true even if 
the only punishment is the moral stigma, or shaming, that accompanies a 
criminal conviction.73 
One of the principal advantages of restorative justice is that, when victims 
voluntarily choose it, it better serves victims’ interests by respecting their 
agency, allowing them to avoid the burdens of the adjudicative process, and, 
most importantly, offering them a resolution that they believe will better 
serve their interests than criminal punishment of the offender.74  But 
prosecutors may not acknowledge these advantages and, even if they do, 
prosecutors may not see serving victims as an adequate reason to forgo the 
benefits of punishment.  Prosecutors regard their overarching responsibility 
as being to serve the public, not any private individual, not even the victim.75  
They may be concerned that, at least when the public’s interests are not 
perfectly aligned with those of the victim, diverting a case to a restorative 
justice process gives priority to the individual victim’s interests over those of 
the public.76 
Wholly apart from their belief in the utility of punishment by incarceration, 
conventional prosecutors are also likely to be philosophically committed to 
the adjudicative process, which, like the concept of criminal punishment, has 
strong historical and constitutional roots and is woven into the fabric of our 
political and legal culture.  Prosecutors may regard restorative justice, as 
compared with the adjudicatory process, as lacking necessary procedural 
 
 72. Bazelon & Green, supra note 27, at 35–40. 
 73. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 
YALE L.J. 1055, 1062 (1998) (describing shaming as “beautifully retributive”).  But see 
generally Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive?:  Retributivism and 
the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157 (2001) 
(challenging the assertion that shaming punishments are retributive).  Of course, a criminal 
conviction never entails only shaming.  Even if there are no other direct consequences (such 
as incarceration or other restraints on liberty, a fine, or an order of restitution), a criminal 
conviction almost invariably gives rise to “collateral consequences,” such as the loss of access 
to government benefits or employment or housing restrictions, that function as indirect 
punishment—a subject on which there is extensive literature. See generally Michael Pinard, 
Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions:  Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457 (2010); Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to 
Ex-offender Reentry, 45 B.C. L. REV. 255 (2004). 
 74. See Bazelon & Green, supra note 27, at 4–7. 
 75. Robinson, supra note 66, at 383 (“Indeed, criminal law is unique in embodying norms 
against violation of societal, rather than personal, interests.  All crimes have society as their 
victim, not merely a single person.”). 
 76. See, e.g., Jennifer G. Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases:  A 
Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1249–50 (1994) (arguing that victim-offender 
mediation disserves offenders, including “by using the leverage of pending criminal process 
to gain advantages for the victim, a private party”). 
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protections.  Offenders may make undesirable concessions or damaging 
admissions77 without the benefit of advice from counsel or other procedural 
protections afforded by the Constitution and statutes.78  While the 
adjudicative process has an established legal structure, takes place in public 
and on the record, is implemented by professional stakeholders who can 
discern and correct procedural defects, and includes appeal rights and other 
mechanisms of accountability if they fail to do so, restorative justice 
processes vary, take place in a private space, and may lack mechanisms for 
transparency and legal oversight to ensure that they are fair to the offender 
and the victim.79  Prosecutors may take the view that the legitimacy of the 
criminal process, and the public’s respect for and confidence in the process, 
requires them to publicly implement constitutionally and legislatively 
prescribed procedures.80 
To some extent, these objections abate if one views restorative justice as a 
form of diversion or as an alternative disposition of a criminal case rather 
than as an alternative to an adjudication—that is, if the analogy is to 
nonprosecution agreements that culminate in drug treatment or some other 
nonpunitive disposition.  Like restorative justice programs, drug treatment 
programs vary, occur in private, and do not have the procedural regularity of 
adjudication, although most programs require participants to make regular 
court appearances to ensure compliance and accountability.  The objective of 
drug treatment courts and other problem-solving courts, however, is not to 
adjudicate guilt or innocence but to reduce the likelihood that an 
acknowledged offender will repeat antisocial behavior, thereby making the 
public safer. 
A related objection is that when an offender is diverted into a restorative 
justice program as an alternative to a criminal prosecution, the offender may 
feel coerced to agree to participate in the program to avoid criminal 
punishment.  The prosecutor may regard the threat of prosecution as an abuse 
of power that denies the offender the constitutional protections afforded by 
the law.  One might take this concern with a grain of salt, however, since 
precisely the same coercion is customarily used to induce offenders to plead 
guilty or to accept other dispositions, including participation in drug 
treatment and other diversion programs. 
Some other philosophical concerns may be empirical concerns in disguise.  
For example, prosecutors may worry that the offender’s participation in the 
 
 77. See generally Mary E. Reimund, Confidentiality in Victim Offender Mediation:  A 
False Promise?, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 401. 
 78. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 76, at 1250 (arguing that victim-offender mediation 
disserves offenders, including “by eliminating procedural protections such as the right to 
counsel or rules of evidence”). 
 79. See Zacharias, supra note 36, at 103–04 (discussing the ethical duty of prosecutors to 
ensure a fair outcome for all sides). 
 80. See, e.g., United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1217 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(upholding the prosecution’s opposition to a bench trial based on the prosecution’s view that 
“there was an overriding public interest in the appearance as well as the fact of a fair trial, 
which could be achieved only by a jury” and “that employing this normal and preferable mode 
of disposing of fact issues in a criminal trial would defuse . . . public criticism”). 
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restorative justice program will lack the voluntariness or sincerity presumed 
to be necessary to the program’s success.81  This is a question worth studying, 
but it is not a foregone conclusion that the success of restorative justice as a 
diversionary strategy is invariably undermined by the threat of a criminal 
prosecution.  Just as coercion may promote an offender’s successful 
participation in a drug treatment program (as judges in drug courts assume to 
be true), the possibility of a criminal prosecution if one does not participate 
satisfactorily in a restorative justice program may motivate offenders 
positively. 
Likewise, prosecutors may question the legitimacy of restorative justice 
out of concern that victims are susceptible to pressure, whether from 
prosecutors or from offenders and their allies, to assent to a restorative justice 
process.  Again, this raises an empirical question worth studying.  It may be 
that prosecutors and agencies implementing restorative justice programs can 
ascertain whether victims’ participation is voluntary or coerced.  Presumably, 
success in avoiding coercion will factor into studies of victim satisfaction 
with restorative justice programs. 
Ultimately, prosecutors may simply assume that prosecution and 
punishment are better at achieving restorative justice processes’ two 
principal objectives.  They may assume, first, that prosecution and 
punishment are more healing for victims because restorative justice does not 
assuage victims’ anger and pain as effectively.82  But, again, this is really an 
empirical claim; no one would claim that all victims prefer restorative justice, 
but the question is whether victims are generally more satisfied when allowed 
to choose between a prosecution process and a restorative justice process 
rather than forced to serve as victim-witnesses in the prosecution process.  
Second, prosecutors may assume that punishment is more successfully 
rehabilitative because, once having experienced the reality of punishment, 
offenders will be more strongly motivated to avoid being punished again.  Of 
all the empirical assumptions underlying prosecutors’ beliefs in adjudication 
and punishment, this is likely the most dubious, however.83  More likely, 
 
 81. See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION WITH REPORT NO. 101B (1994), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/1994_am_101b.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/XGR4-EUAG]. 
 82. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 76, at 1249–50.  Victim-offender mediation  
disserves the interests of victims by stressing forgiveness and reconciliation before 
victims have the vindication of a public finding that the offender is guilty.  In 
addition, [victim-offender mediation] suppresses victims’ outrage and loss by 
assuming that these negative feelings can be expressed and resolved in the course 
of a few hours spent meeting with the offender. 
Id. 
 83. See infra note 137 and accompanying text; see also PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 
31:  THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 1–2, 11 (2009), https:// 
www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2009/03/02/pspp_1in31_report_final_web_32609.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RBQ5-SCB8] (noting that the “escalation” of imprisonment of offenders in 
the United States over the last twenty-five years is “astonishing” but “new national and state 
research shows that we are well past the point of diminishing returns”); Raymond V. Liedka 
et al., The Crime-Control Effect of Incarceration:  Does Scale Matter?, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & 
PUB. POL’Y 245, 272 (2006) (“The findings developed here go beyond the claim . . . that this 
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traditional prosecutors who have embraced tough-on-crime policies will 
simply eschew rehabilitation as an objective.84 
It seems natural for prosecutors to assume that the traditional criminal 
justice process achieves more important objectives, or better achieves its 
objectives, than restorative justice processes.  Mainstream prosecutors tend 
to be traditionalists rather than innovators.  The essential work of 
prosecutors—investigating and prosecuting crimes—has not changed over 
time.  Those who become prosecutors are generally attracted to that 
adjudicatory work, not to using prosecutorial power to address broader social 
problems or to address individual offenders’ personal challenges.  
Prosecutors are lawyers, not social workers; they were taught to navigate the 
adversarial system, and they regard themselves as trial lawyers, 
notwithstanding the relative infrequency of criminal trials.  While some 
mainstream prosecutors have proceeded in a more experimental spirit, 
reimagining themselves as “community prosecutors”85 or conceptualizing 
some criminal problems as mental health or other social problems,86 the 
typical prosecutor is a lawyer trained in the litigation process who is 
rewarded—reputationally and for purposes of internal promotion—for 
winning at trial and assembling a track record of convictions.  The typical 
prosecutor is not trained to view social problems as criminal problems and to 
look for innovative legal or criminal justice solutions.87 
 
continued prison expansion has reached a point of declining marginal returns.  Instead, 
accelerating diminishing marginal returns were found.”); Susan M. Olson & Albert W. Dzur, 
Revisiting Informal Justice:  Restorative Justice and Democratic Professionalism, 38 LAW & 
SOC’Y 139, 143 (2004) (stating that restorative justice proponents “believe that putting 
offenders in jails and prisons reinforces more than deters criminality”). 
 84. Starting in the 1970s, critics on the left and right attacked the rehabilitative model as 
a response to crime from differing perspectives.  Left-leaning critics decried the model as 
enabling racial discrimination and arbitrariness because of the wide berth given to judges.  
Critics on the right regarded the response as coddling criminals and encouraging recidivism.  
By the 1990s, the rehabilitative model had been largely subsumed by tough-on-crime policies. 
Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. REV. 189, 199–200 (2013).  More 
recently, prominent advocates on both sides of the aisle have returned to the rehabilitative 
model with a significant revision:  requiring its outcomes to be measured by “evidence-based 
programs and risk assessment tools.” Id. at 201–02.  This “actuarial” model, also called 
“neorehabilitation,” has been critiqued by some scholars as a well-intentioned response that is 
nonetheless riven with implicit biases designed to create skewed outcomes because these so-
called objective measuring tools are not in fact objective. Id. at 214–20; see also Eric J. Miller, 
Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 417, 425 (2009). 
 85. Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
321, 326 (2002). 
 86. Christopher Connelly, In Dallas County DA Race, Both Candidates Say They’re 
Change Agents for Criminal Justice Reform, KERA NEWS (Oct. 30, 2018), 
https://www.keranews.org/post/dallas-county-da-race-both-candidates-say-theyre-change-
agents-criminal-justice [https://perma.cc/4LKW-FQUV] (noting that both the Democratic and 
Republican nominees supported diversion for drug offenders). 
 87. See, e.g., Carrie Johnson, D.C. Prosecutors, Once Dubious, Are Becoming Believers 
in Restorative Justice, NPR (July 2, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/02/ 
735506637/d-c-prosecutors-once-dubious-are-becoming-believers-in-restorative-justice 
[https://perma.cc/HPL6-ENMU] (quoting one prosecutor deriding the idea of restorative 
justice:  “Oh, OK, so we’re not going to prosecute you?  We’re going to sit around in a circle 
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Further, prosecutors are trained to embrace the common-law style of 
reasoning that justifies the traditional criminal process.  The assumptions 
about the retributive and utilitarian effects of punishment, for example, are 
deeply rooted in our jurisprudence and appear to be matters of common sense 
and ordinary experience.88  Restorative justice, in contrast, does not reflect 
prosecutors’ everyday experiences and indeed may be an utterly foreign 
concept.  The data that does exist to suggest that restorative justice is 
effective is too limited to be persuasive to most mainstream prosecutors.  
Even if the data were more robust, it is hard to let go of the old ways.  In 
other aspects of their work, many prosecutors favor received wisdom over 
empirical evidence—for example, in assuming the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications and confessions despite decades of social science evidence 
establishing their inherent unreliability.89  Assumptions about the utility of 
punishment are, if anything, even more deeply ingrained. 
Finally, wholly apart from their own conviction about the utility of 
punishment, prosecutors are likely to be deferential to the evident legislative 
belief that criminal offenses should ordinarily be addressed through 
prosecution and punishment.  In general, prosecutors understand that they are 
executive branch officials whose responsibility is to carry out the law.  In 
some jurisdictions, such as California, Colorado, and Vermont, the 
legislature has endorsed restorative justice processes, at least in certain 
criminal cases.90  Elsewhere, however, prosecutors may regard it as 
inconsistent with the legislative will or with legislative assumptions for 
prosecutors to unilaterally pursue restorative justice in place of conventional 
criminal justice strategies. 
B.  Issues of Power, Politics, and Fairness 
There is another set of reasons why prosecutors are likely to be 
unsympathetic to restorative justice processes—namely, that these processes 
take away power and discretion from prosecutors and give it to various other 
actors, including social workers, community members, victims, and 
offenders.  Prosecutors are likely to find this problematic in three respects:  
first, prosecutors are reluctant to cede power and influence in the criminal 
process; second, they are reluctant to enhance others’ power and influence; 
 
with, like, the hippies down the hallway, and we’re going to have a talk and then you don’t 
have any punishment?”). 
 88. Mark R. Fondacaro & Megan J. O’Toole, American Punitiveness and Mass 
Incarceration:  Psychological Perspectives on Retributive and Consequentialist Responses to 
Crime, 18 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 477, 482–86 (2015). 
 89. See, e.g., Jennifer Emily & Steve McGonigle, Dallas Prosecutors Still Heavily Rely 
on Eyewitness Testimony Despite Questions About Its Reliability, DALL. MORNING NEWS 
(June 6, 2018, 9:50 PM), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/courts/2018/06/06/dallas-
prosecutors-still-heavily-rely-on-eyewitness-testimony-despite-questions-about-its-
reliability/ [https://perma.cc/7RDC-DD6E] (reporting that prosecutors continue to use 
unreliable eyewitness identifications to obtain convictions despite nineteen DNA exonerations 
in eyewitness identification cases). 
 90. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 2a(a) (2020); S. 678, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2019). 
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and, finally, practical and political considerations may dampen interest in 
restorative justice. 
1.  Prosecutors’ Interest in Retaining Power and Control, and the Perceived 
Neutral Exercise of Discretion 
Prosecutors are widely considered to be the most powerful actors in the 
criminal justice system, given their authority to decide whom to investigate, 
when to bring charges, which charges to bring, which plea bargains to offer, 
and which sentences to recommend.91  When prosecutors bring charges that 
come with mandatory minimum sentences, the defense attorney’s input is 
virtually irrelevant, and the judge’s ultimate power to determine the 
offender’s sentence is greatly, if not entirely, constrained.92  Power is 
difficult to give up and embracing restorative justice practices requires 
ceding significant ground.93  Because restorative justice processes are by 
their nature individualized, community-oriented, and victim-centered, and 
require participation by outside facilitators, prosecutors will perceive that 
they have limited involvement in the process and diminished influence over 
the outcome.94 
Prosecutorial concern about ceding power is not necessarily ego-driven or 
self-interested.  In the United States, nearly all prosecutors are elected and 
directly accountable to the voters who put them in office.  Part of that 
accountability involves prosecutors taking responsibility for case 
outcomes—good and bad—that result from the exercise of their discretion.  
Prosecutors who adhere to traditional models of prosecution are conditioned 
to exercise their discretion in far more limited and traditionally acceptable 
ways than restorative justice contemplates.  While the exercise of discretion 
may include diverting or referring cases to problem-solving courts, these 
decisions fall within a traditionally trained prosecutor’s expertise, providing 
a level of confidence in the results.95  Most prosecutors are not trained in 
 
 91. See, e.g., Eric S. Fish, Against Adversary Prosecution, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1419, 1424, 
1445 (2018) (describing the prosecutor’s “unequal power” to “set the terms” of a case and any 
subsequent negotiation by using a variety of tools); Kay L. Levine, The New Prosecution, 40 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1125, 1126 (2005) (“Recent evidence suggests that the imperial role of 
the prosecutor has reached new heights in the past decade.”). 
 92. Michael A. Simons, Prosecutors as Punishment Theorists:  Seeking Sentencing 
Justice, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 303, 354 (2009). 
 93. For an argument in favor of prosecutors yielding power, see Jocelyn Simonson, Essay, 
The Place of “the People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV 249, 296 (2019) 
(“[S]tate actors should take the bold step of ceding power, of deliberately facilitating power 
shifts down to the marginalized populations who traditionally have the least input into 
everyday justice.”). 
 94. Susan M. Olson & Albert W. Dzur, Reconstructing Professional Roles in Restorative 
Justice Programs, 2003 UTAH L. REV.  57, 62–63 (arguing that restorative justice “attacks the 
whole logic of the criminal justice system” with processes and outcomes that mean “[e]xperts 
in substantive criminal law are not needed”). 
 95. Olson & Dzur, supra note 83, at 145–146 (contrasting the “professional expertise” 
and “specialization” required to address substantive and procedural legal issues with 
restorative justice theory, which “seems to imply little need for criminal justice professionals 
at all”). 
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restorative justice or even familiar with it.  Choosing to try out a restorative 
justice approach may feel as unnerving and unnatural to a prosecutor as 
performing daily tasks using only one’s nondominant hand.  Adding to the 
discomfort is outsourcing the case to restorative justice facilitators who are 
not attorneys or state actors.  Prosecutors may be skeptical that these nonstate 
actors adequately understand the public safety risks and benefits of offering 
their programs.96  Some prosecutors may be skeptical of restorative justice 
itself, seeing it as an easy way out for offenders who can forgo prison and 
feel free to reoffend by “basically singing Kumbaya.”97 
Compounding this skepticism is the fact that restorative justice processes 
are not transparent.  Prosecutors are tasked with keeping the public safe.  The 
traditional adjudicatory processes—from trials to drug courts—take place in 
open court, allowing the media to report on what transpires and for the public 
to judge for themselves whether prosecutors are fulfilling their promises.  
Restorative justice, by contrast, takes place behind closed doors to allow the 
participants a safe, private space required to do the hard work of confronting 
each other and grappling with the deeply personal nature of the harm inflicted 
by the crime.  Some prosecutors may view this process as too secretive and 
impenetrable to be adequately assessed either by their own offices or by the 
public. 
2.  Prosecutors’ Representation of the Public, Not the Victim 
Much has been written about a prosecutor’s mandate to be a minister of 
justice, and that, as a “clientless lawyer,”98 the prosecutor must represent all 
constituencies rather than the interests of a single individual or interest 
group.99  Restorative justice is victim-centered:  it begins and ends with what 
the victim wants and needs to heal and move forward.  But what a particular 
victim wants may be sharply at odds with what the community demands.  
Take, for example, a police officer’s fatal shooting of a civilian without legal 
justification.  Depending on the evidence, the traditional prosecutor will 
consider a range of alternatives ranging from initiating murder or negligent 
homicide charges to pursuing no charges at all.  In the latter scenario, the 
prosecutor will be braced for a public outcry, armed with the traditional 
 
 96. Cecelia Klingele et al., Reimagining Criminal Justice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 953, 981 (“In 
many ways, the prosecutor is the actor best positioned within the criminal justice system to 
act as a problem-solver and advocate for public safety.”). 
 97. Lars Larson (@TheLarsLarsonShow), FACEBOOK (Mar. 1, 2018, 12:50 PM), 
https://www.facebook.com/TheLarsLarsonShow/posts/restorative-justice-is-a-joke-the-
parkland-florida-high-school-where-nick-cruz-m/2013656965329442/ [https://perma.cc/ 
NVN8-F92Y]; see also Tovia Smith, After Assault, Some Campuses Focus on Healing over 
Punishment, NPR (July 25, 2017, 4:30 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/07/25/539334346/ 
restorative-justice-an-alternative-to-the-process-campuses-use-for-sexual-assaul [https:// 
perma.cc/V9DG-8XW8] (quoting a law professor as having “once dismissed restorative 
justice as ‘too kumbaya’”). 
 98. Gold, supra note 34, at 88–89. 
 99. Zacharias, supra note 36, at 57. 
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response:  the evidence did not convince the prosecutor, or would not 
convince a jury, that the officer was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.100 
Now imagine a factual scenario in which the officer’s criminal culpability 
seems clear, but the prosecutor chooses to exercise discretion by choosing 
restorative justice over filing charges because that is what the victim’s family 
wants.  Rather than a trial or a guilty plea, there is a dialogue between the 
victim’s family and the officer, or one involving the family and other 
members of the community.  The officer is not convicted, much less 
sentenced to jail or prison.  Instead, the officer undertakes to repair the harm 
according to the family’s wishes, whether that means resigning from the 
force, providing restitution, making a public apology accepting full 
responsibility, performing community service, some combination of these 
measures, or something else entirely. 
Such a scenario is difficult to envision because of the public outrage that 
would ensue.  Indeed, following the recent high-profile prosecution in Texas 
of Amber Guyger, a white police officer convicted of murdering Botham 
Jean, an unarmed black man, there was a national uproar when the victim’s 
brother, Brandt Jean, offered words of comfort and healing to Guyger.101  At 
her sentencing hearing, where Guyger received ten years in prison, Brandt 
told her, “I don’t even want you to go to jail.”102  While few people criticized 
 
 100. See, e.g., Tracy Connor et al., Ferguson Cop Darren Wilson Not Indicted in Shooting 
of Michael Brown, NBC NEWS (Nov. 25, 2014, 1:10 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
storyline/michael-brown-shooting/ferguson-cop-darren-wilson-not-indicted-shooting-
michael-brown-n255391 [https://perma.cc/KM23-D2YP] (“Bob McCulloch, the St. Louis 
County prosecutor, described Brown’s death as a tragedy but said that the grand jury had found 
no probable cause for any of the charges it considered against [the police officer], which 
included first-degree murder and the lesser charge of manslaughter.”); Jacey Fortin & Maya 
Salam, No Charges for San Francisco Officers in Deaths of 2 Knife-Wielding Men, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/us/san-francisco-shooting-officer-
charge.html [https://perma.cc/SKM6-HBP6] (“‘Whether or not the officer could have used 
another tactic such as nonlethal force, or simply waiting, is not a factor we can even consider 
under current law,’ District Attorney George Gascón said in a statement.”). 
 101. See, e.g., Natalie Gordon, Understanding What Restorative Justice Is and Isn’t, 
LAW360 (Jan. 5, 2020, 8:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1228012/understanding-
what-restorative-justice-is-and-isn-t [https://perma.cc/PGW9-TB4W] (“This was not a 
restorative justice conference in the traditional sense, but it embodied restorative principles, 
such as forgiveness, remorse and apologies, that are critical to the process of healing.”); 
Michael Martin, Barbershop:  Botham Jean, Amber Guyger and Forgiveness, NPR (Oct. 5, 
2019, 5:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/05/767572862/barbershop-botham-jean-
amber-guyger-and-forgiveness [https://perma.cc/V68X-BMMX] (stating that “some were 
deeply pained and even affronted by what happened”); Tony Norman, Radical Forgiveness 
as a Two-Edged Sword, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 4, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.post-
gazette.com/opinion/tony-norman/2019/10/04/Botham-Jean-Amber-Guyger-murder-verdict-
forgiveness-restorative-justice/stories/201910040054 [https://perma.cc/6JSN-7LFY] (“Such 
forgiveness is often considered ‘cheap grace’ by its critics because it requires black people, 
even in the midst of their pain, to dispense forgiveness and other indulgences like we were 
medieval popes offering white people pardons paid for with black suffering sanctioned by the 
‘white Jesus’ of American Christianity.”). 
 102. Bill Hutchinson, Extraordinary Act of Mercy:  Brother of Botham Jean Hugs and 
Forgives Amber Guyger After 10-Year Sentence Imposed, ABC NEWS (Oct. 2, 2019, 6:47 
PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/jury-deciding-sentence-police-officer-amber-guyger-
wrong/story?id=66002182 [https://perma.cc/KWP2-PGL8]. 
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Brandt directly, many felt that it was wrong of him to offer her forgiveness, 
believing that Guyger was a killer with racist tendencies whose sentence had 
been insufficiently punitive.103 
Prosecutors are trained to exercise their discretion in the broader public 
interest to avoid outcomes that seem arbitrary or unfair.  In so doing, they 
foster a perception of neutrality by meting out consequences that are, at least 
in theory, consistent across the board.104  Let us return again to the 
hypothetical case of the officer-involved shooting where the offender and the 
victim’s family go through a restorative justice process rather than a criminal 
prosecution.  Now imagine, one month later, that there is a similar shooting 
in the same jurisdiction.  This time, the prosecutor files murder charges 
because that is what this particular victim’s family wants.  This kind of 
decision-making would appear arbitrary if not senseless.  The prosecutor 
would not only incur the ire of many in the community, but she would lose 
credibility as an authority figure capable of exercising discretion fairly by 
treating like offenders alike and like victims alike.  Concerns for fairness and 
standardized outcomes are at the heart of a prosecutor’s decision-making 
process.  Moreover, prosecutors, encouraged by the victims’ rights 
movement, are often trained to equate fair outcomes with punitive outcomes 
and may believe that a restorative justice–seeking victim ill serves victims’ 
interests as a whole. 
3.  Practical and Political Considerations 
The progressive prosecutor movement is on the rise, but it is still confined 
to discrete pockets of the country, usually major cities with racially and 
ethnically diverse populations that are Democratic strongholds, such as 
Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, San Francisco, and St. Louis.105  The vast 
majority of elected prosecutors serve more centrist or conservative districts 
where the traditional approaches to criminal justice still hold sway.106  These 
 
 103. Mitch Mitchell, Amber Guyger Sentenced to 10 Years in Prison for Murder of Botham 
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moderate. See, e.g., Alan Greenblatt, Progressives Find Political Success, and Pushback, as 
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2020] RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND PROSECUTORS 2309 
prosecutors serve constituents who may share their skepticism of seemingly 
liberal approaches to crime.107 
The current presidential administration’s hostility to progressive 
prosecutors and their innovative methods further complicates the political 
calculus.  Attorney General Barr castigated progressive prosecutors as a 
group in a widely reported public speech at a conference for the Fraternal 
Order of Police in August 2019, calling them “demoralizing to law 
enforcement and dangerous to public safety.”108  He continued, “[they] spend 
their time undercutting the police, letting criminals off the hook, and refusing 
to enforce the law.”109 
The attacks have become more pointed.  William McSwain, who is the 
U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, blamed a high-profile 
progressive prosecutor for a shooting that left six Philadelphia police officers 
wounded.110  In a press release, McSwain said the crime was due to “a new 
culture of disrespect for law enforcement in this City that is promoted and 
championed by District Attorney Larry Krasner—and I am fed up with it.”111  
At a rally in Hershey, Pennsylvania, President Trump called Krasner “the 
worst district attorney,” saying, “[h]e lets killers out almost immediately . . . 
get yourself a new prosecutor.”112  While Krasner has a strong liberal base 
of supporters, most prosecutors do not, and Trump’s record of inciting voters 
to oust other elected officials with whom he disagrees is a sobering reminder 
that there is a high price to be paid for attracting his ire.113  Trump, Barr, and 
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the attorneys general who are loyal to them exert great influence on how laws 
are enacted and enforced.  While those loyalists have yet to attack restorative 
justice by name, they have created a culture war between law-and-order 
prosecutors and progressives, thus raising the stakes for centrist and 
conservative DAs who might otherwise consider restorative justice 
programs. 
III.  WHY “SEEKING JUSTICE” SHOULD INCLUDE “RESTORATIVE JUSTICE” 
Proponents of restorative justice in the United States, such as Danielle 
Sered, recognize that most prosecutors are likely to be resistant.  Therefore, 
these proponents suggest that the best reform strategy is to bypass 
prosecutors and appeal to the community.114  The problem with this approach 
is two-fold.  First, prosecutors have considerable influence over the 
development of legislation bearing on criminal justice, both because of their 
own political clout as elected officials and because of their presumed 
expertise.  And, second, prosecutors exert influence over how the community 
itself sees criminal justice policy. 
This is not to say that all prosecutors must be won over.  But for restorative 
justice to gain a foothold in counties across the United States, a sizeable 
number must be.  Progressive prosecutors are undertaking a criminal justice 
experiment by embracing restorative justice as an alternative in juvenile 
cases and nonviolent crimes involving adults.  Several are willing to extend 
restorative justice to cases involving serious, violent felonies.  Though these 
progressive prosecutors are relatively few in number, they hold office in 
populous jurisdictions, collectively serving millions of people.115  Data from 
their restorative justice programs will provide insight into whether victims 
and the community are well served by restorative justice procedures in these 
and other cases. 
Assuming the results are positive, the expansion of restorative justice 
programs outside progressive prosecutors’ jurisdictions will depend on 
traditional prosecutors’ willingness and ability to look beyond their ingrained 
assumptions about crime and punishment.  It will also depend on their 
willingness to cede control to nonstate actors—mainly community-based 
nonprofits.  They will have to be convinced that it is worth the time and 
expenditure of funds and political capital.  Empirical data, an individual 
prosecutor’s openness to the ideas of progressives, and political 
considerations—which will be shaped by the results of the 2020 presidential 
election—are all crucial factors in the analysis.  But a shift toward restorative 
justice has begun, and its continued expansion seems plausible.  There is 
already a template, albeit inexact.  Prosecutors on both sides of the aisle have 
increasingly accepted drug courts and other problem-solving courts and 
diversion programs, many instituted by judiciaries and state legislatures,116 
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and it is conceivable that restorative justice may eventually be added to 
mainstream prosecutors’ lists of acceptable alternatives. 
Proponents of restorative justice will have an easier time achieving reform, 
however, if they can make a case for this alternative that appeals to 
mainstream prosecutors.  And this may not be easy.  In general, proponents 
have not been able to describe and justify restorative justice as an alternative 
to prosecution and punishment in a manner that resonates with, or seems 
credible to, prosecutors.  Too often, restorative justice arguments founder on 
skepticism that it lets criminals skate free by engaging in “kumbaya” talk 
therapy followed by insincere proclamations of remorse and redemption.  
The intensely personal and individualized nature of restorative justice 
methods—each case is unique because its outcome turns on the particulars 
of the victim and the offender—makes it vulnerable to this distorting and 
reductive rhetoric. 
Even setting aside the inherent challenge of exporting this tailor-made 
alternative to stakeholders accustomed to a system of mass production, 
conventional rationales for restorative justice do not resonate with 
prosecutors, because proponents tend to portray restorative justice as a 
rejection of traditional criminal justice principles, objectives, and 
philosophy.117  For example, David Vogt describes restorative justice as a 
“philosophy” that is “based on a different conception of justice from that of 
the criminal law.”118  If so, prosecutors would be hard put to embrace 
restorative justice because their role as executive branch officials is to 
execute criminal laws that have a distinct philosophical premise.  To the 
extent restorative justice advocacy relies on a radical alternative criminal 
justice philosophy, it will not win prosecutors over but rather reinforce their 
negative preconceptions. 
The zero-sum argument that restorative justice must function as an 
alternative to criminal punishment, at least in cases of serious misconduct, 
will not convince skeptics.  Indeed, such an argument runs counter to the 
central tenet that restorative justice is victim-centered and victim-chosen.  
But not all victims will want restorative justice, and some will seek traditional 
court remedies.  Given this reality, advocacy and arguments for its use must 
change.  Ross London, for example, conceptualizes restorative justice as a 
process directed at “the restoration of trust.”119  This conception is 
unappealing to prosecutors both because, as he acknowledges, the concept 
“may seem too fuzzy and idealistic to be taken seriously”120 and because the 
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multiple objectives said to be served by criminal punishment may take 
priority, in prosecutors’ view, over the restoration of trust.  Moreover, and as 
even London acknowledges, punishment has a role, because “[a]n offender’s 
voluntary submission to a deserved punishment in cases of serious crime . . . 
is certainly one of the means by which trust in that offender and for society 
can be repaired.”121  He reasons that, while “the offender’s apology and 
remorse [are] fundamental to the restoration of the victim’s emotional well-
being,” these expressions seem more genuine when he pleads guilty and 
submits to punishment.122 
We also doubt that mainstream prosecutors will be widely receptive to the 
argument that restorative justice will help to combat mass incarceration.  
First, some prosecutors may not acknowledge overincarceration as a 
problem.  And even among those who do, the majority may be unwilling to 
use restorative justice in cases of serious violent crime without the additional 
sanction of prison, particularly in high-profile, politically fraught cases such 
as the example in Part II.B.  More appealing to mainstream prosecutors will 
be using restorative justice as an alternative to incarceration for juvenile and 
low-level adult offenders, and using it as a means of shortening the sentences 
for serious offenders who will not be dangerous if released.  These strategies 
are more appealing because they do not require undertaking a new procedural 
approach or seeming to adopt a new criminal justice philosophy. 
One can debate whether these more conventional strategies will 
substantially reduce the large number of prisoners, which some attribute to 
the lengthy incarceration of violent offenders.123  As a practical matter, 
however, mainstream prosecutors are unlikely to see restorative justice as an 
alternative to incarcerating violent, repeat, and presumptively dangerous 
offenders.  But they may ultimately be willing to consider restorative justice 
for violent offenders whose crimes are less serious, whose criminal histories 
are less lengthy, and who show the capacity to change.  The term “violent 
offender” encompasses a broad swath of conduct, including crimes such as 
burglary and purse-snatching that many would not consider “violent.”124  
There is a distinction between these “low-level, nonviolent offenders,” who 
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include first-time offenders and those driven to commit crimes because of 
poverty and drug abuse,125 and serial rapists or murderers.126 
To allay mainstream prosecutors’ skepticism toward using restorative 
justice—whether for juveniles, nonviolent offenders, or low-level violent 
offenders, an affirmative case must be made.  It is not enough and, indeed 
unhelpful, to say, “the current system has failed so let’s replace it with a 
radical new plan.”  Instead, proponents must argue that restorative justice 
serves the public consistently with conventional criminal justice 
philosophies, policies, objectives, and principles.  A starting point, in our 
view, is to acknowledge that the criminal justice process serves multiple 
objectives, many of which are in tension in any given case.  No approach 
ideally serves all objectives.  But, in some cases, on balance, restorative 
justice may be the preferable approach among the alternatives. 
As we suggested in an earlier article, a strong argument in favor of 
restorative justice is that it better serves the needs and interests of crime 
victims who choose it.127  Some victims will prefer, and find it more healing, 
to engage in a restorative justice process, where they are more personally 
involved than in an adjudicative process, where they can express their views 
and experiences with less constraint, where they have more influence over 
the outcomes, and where they may receive, rather than a more punitive result, 
an apology from the offender along with expressions of contrition, 
explanations, or material reparations.128 
While a prosecutor’s job is to serve the public, not individual crime 
victims, a legitimate conception of the public interest must call for giving 
considerable weight to victims’ interests while stopping short of giving them 
veto power.129  The law presumes that the public has an obligation to promote 
individual victims’ well-being.130  That understanding is reflected in various 
provisions of victims’ rights law, such as those that call for prosecutors to 
consult with victims about proposed criminal charges and plea bargains, that 
allow victims to speak at sentencing proceedings, and that require 
prosecutors to seek monetary restitution for victims and for courts to award 
it.131  While prosecutors cannot entirely abdicate decision-making 
responsibility to crime victims, in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, 
there is nothing anomalous about giving substantial weight to victims’ 
interests.132 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. See id. 
 127. See generally Bazelon & Green, supra note 27. 
 128. See Eric Gonzalez, Using the Power of Prosecutors to Drive Reform, CRIM. JUST., Fall 
2019, at 9, 12 (maintaining that “many victims find the restorative justice process much more 
meaningful and satisfying than sending the person who hurt them to prison because it provides 
victim-centered services and allows victims to get answers from those who caused them 
harm”).  See generally STRANG, supra note 25. 
 129. Erin C. Blondel, Victims’ Rights in an Adversary System, 58 DUKE L.J. 237, 246–47 
(2008). 
 130. See Gold, supra note 34, at 95–96. 
 131. See Bazelon & Green, supra note 27, at 2–3. 
 132. See Green, supra note 40, at 596. 
2314 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
Whether to defer to a victim’s preference for a restorative justice process 
in a particular case or in a category of cases depends on the importance of 
other public interests and whether they point in a different direction.  Taking 
deterrence as an important objective of the criminal justice process, one must 
consider whether diverting some cases of serious offenses to a restorative 
justice process will significantly undermine the criminal law’s deterrent 
effect.  Consider the earlier example of a police officer’s unjustified shooting 
of an unarmed civilian.  The DA may have concerns that, even if the police 
officer were to acknowledge culpability and be discharged from the police 
force, other officers would not be deterred from committing similar acts in 
the future unless more punitive consequences, including prosecution and 
incarceration, were to follow. 
But it is not clear that punishment must be sought whenever possible in 
order to deter criminal offenses.  The argument for deterrence by 
incarceration might be convincing if punishment for every serious violent 
offense were swift and sure, but that has never been true:  many offenders go 
unpunished because, for example, the crime is not reported, the wrongdoer is 
not identified, or the proof is insufficient.  There is little empirical evidence 
to suggest that many would-be offenders are significantly deterred by the risk 
of being caught and punished, much less under what circumstances they are 
deterred.133  And under these circumstances, it is uncertain whether 
implementing restorative justice programs would decrease whatever 
deterrence the criminal law now achieves.  Since restorative justice would 
not be implemented in all cases but, at most, in some cases where the victim 
was amenable, the risk of punishment would remain.  Unless the criminal 
law’s deterrent effect would significantly decrease with the adoption of 
restorative justice programs, the interest in deterrence will not be a strong 
countervailing consideration. 
Likewise, the interest in preserving the criminal law’s expressive role is 
not necessarily a significant counterweight.  It is not a foregone conclusion 
that restorative justice processes would erode the expressive function of the 
criminal law.  Criminal laws would remain on the books and violations would 
remain subject to punishment.  Punishment is not inevitable even now, and 
in cases of some low-level offenses, it may not be the norm.  Further reducing 
the rate of punishment may not be seen as a retreat from the societal 
commitment to the norms underlying the criminal law.  This is particularly 
true if restorative justice is explained to the public not as an act of lenity but 
as an alternative way to achieve justice by vindicating the victim’s interests. 
To some extent, the ability of restorative justice to serve traditional 
criminal law objectives depends on how the process is implemented.  The 
individual process itself is private, but a detailed, publicly available 
description of how the program operates and its empirical outcomes can and 
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should be public.  Further, restorative justice need not always be in lieu of 
jail or prison.  As London describes, the process can be employed in 
conjunction with the criminal process as a way to achieve an agreed, lesser 
sentence.134  But even where the process is used as a diversion from the 
criminal process, the offender can agree to undertake a public act of 
contrition.  Where the outcome of any individual restorative justice process 
is public and entails the acceptance of burdens by the offender, the process 
can serve traditional functions of criminal punishment—deterrence, 
affirmation of societal norms, and retribution.  Unless one concludes that 
only the deprivation of liberty can serve these functions—an assumption that 
is inconsistent with our nation’s historical use of shaming punishments—the 
public resolution of the restorative justice process can promote traditional 
objectives in much the same way as carceral punishment does.135 
To be sure, the victim will be promoting her own objectives, preferences, 
and interests, not the public interest in a resolution that best achieves the 
objectives of the criminal process.  But there is no reason to assume that the 
victim’s objectives will be vastly misaligned with those of the public.  On the 
contrary, prosecutors often assume, when they are making discretionary 
decisions, that the public interests and the victim’s interests are largely 
aligned.  The same can be presumed true when victims make discretionary 
decisions in a restorative justice process. 
That leaves the interest in promoting public safety through rehabilitation 
of the offender.  Needless to say, this is where restorative justice, which aims 
to restore the offender no less than the victim, makes the strongest claim.136  
The empirical evidence that exists—albeit limited and lacking in longitudinal 
data—tends to show that the recidivism rate is lower for offenders who 
satisfactorily complete a restorative justice program, as compared with those 
who are sentenced in the criminal process.  These results track programs 
where restorative justice processes typically result in an agreement to engage 
in education, receive counseling, maintain full-time employment, and/or 
engage in other activities that are assumed to be prosocial and rehabilitative.  
Restorative justice programs encourage offenders to agree on rehabilitative 
measures and rigorously supervise offenders to ensure they comply with their 
agreements.  In contrast, no one would expect a prison sentence or other 
outcome of the criminal justice process to be particularly rehabilitative, and, 
on the contrary, one might expect incarceration generally to be 
criminogenic.137 
The argument that will best appeal to conventional prosecutors is that 
restorative justice is not unlike other diversion programs in that it will 
sometimes be the best way to serve the mixture of public interests that 
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prosecutors are expected to pursue through the criminal process.  Where the 
victim seeks restorative justice and the offender is a willing participant, this 
alternative may serve those individual interests better than criminal 
prosecution would.  Provided—and this is a key caveat—that it will not result 
in a risk to public safety, on balance, restorative justice may be preferable.  
Using restorative justice in these cases is not dissimilar to the use of problem-
solving courts, in that these noncarceral alternatives seek to serve the public 
interest without radically departing from the norm. 
Viewed this way, restorative justice is not an abdication of control to social 
workers, victims, and prison abolitionists.  Instead, the use of restorative 
justice respects prosecutorial power and discretion because offenders are 
diverted to restorative justice processes only when the prosecutor makes a 
threshold determination that the process is preferable after factoring in 
fairness of outcomes and public safety.  This means that prosecutors must 
develop an understanding of available restorative justice processes and an 
appreciation for whom they work best.  Prosecutors cannot simply shuttle 
cases off to social service agencies.  Further, prosecutors have a 
responsibility to monitor the outcomes of restorative justice processes, both 
to confirm that the results are generally consistent with the public interest 
and so that prosecutors can hold themselves accountable to the public for 
when and how these processes are employed.  Monitoring cannot simply be 
informal; rather, the collection and analysis of data are essential. 
It is reasonable to conclude that by deferring to victims’ preferences for 
restorative justice processes, a prosecutor will serve other criminal justice 
interests as well.  Crime victims often feel mistrustful of, or neglected by, 
prosecutors’ offices.138  This attitude undermines prosecutors’ effectiveness, 
both because it makes victims more reluctant to report crimes and because it 
makes them less willing to cooperate with a prosecution.  Employing 
restorative justice as a diversionary alternative gives victims a greater say in 
how criminal cases are addressed—both a choice between a restorative 
justice process or the criminal adjudication process and, if the former is 
elected, a greater role in the process and outcome.  One might expect 
prosecutors who use restorative justice to win greater trust from victims.  In 
communities that perceive the prosecutors and police to be overly punitive, 
the use of restorative justice may promote public trust as well.139 
CONCLUSION 
Proponents of restorative justice have sold progressive prosecutors on it.  
Newly elected progressive prosecutors will soon attempt to carry out their 
campaign pledges to use, or expand the use of, restorative justice.  This will 
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mean that in some felony cases, including some involving serious, violent 
crimes where the prosecutor would ordinarily pursue a criminal conviction 
and carceral punishment, the prosecutor will offer restorative justice as an 
alternative.  If both the offender and the victim agree, the prosecutor will 
divert the case to a social service agency to administer a restorative justice 
process; and if a successful resolution is reported, the prosecutor will decline 
to bring, or will dismiss, criminal charges.  Eventually, progressive 
prosecutors will gather both anecdotal evidence and data about the use of 
restorative justice in different types of felony cases.  Assuming that 
proponents’ claims are substantiated—i.e., if the evidence shows a lower 
recidivism rate and greater victim satisfaction—proponents will urge 
mainstream prosecutors to follow suit by implementing or expanding 
restorative justice programs. 
As this Article has shown, when it comes to mainstream prosecutors, 
proponents of restorative justice will have a host of concerns to allay and 
objections to overcome.  How advocates argue their cause will matter.  It is 
unlikely that conventional prosecutors can be persuaded to radically 
reimagine the criminal justice process.  But they need not be.  One need not 
conceptualize restorative justice as a rejection of the traditional adjudicatory 
process; instead, restorative justice is an alternative that runs parallel to 
traditional adjudication.  Restorative justice processes can also be 
rhetorically deradicalized by analogizing their use to the establishment of 
drug courts and other diversion programs that have a proven track record of 
success.  This analogy is not far-fetched:  a restorative justice process is 
comparable to a drug treatment program in that the offender must undergo 
rigorous rehabilitative processes, and intensive supervision, and meet any 
number of benchmarks as a condition of a nonprosecution agreement. 
From prosecutors’ perspective, the key question is whether the public 
interest is best served in a given case when, rather than being convicted and 
punished, an offender successfully completes a restorative justice process.  
The answer will turn in large part on assumptions or available data on such 
questions as whether restorative justice lowers recidivism rates or better 
serves crime victims, or whether implementing restorative justice on a 
selective basis meaningfully reduces the deterrent effect or the expressive 
value of the criminal law.  No matter how much data becomes available, 
prosecutors’ receptivity to restorative justice will ultimately turn on their 
interpretation of what it means to carry out their mandate to “do justice,” an 
interpretation that, to some degree, is based on value judgments, received 
wisdom, and belief in the efficacy of the status quo.  Even if data were to 
show convincingly that a restorative justice process elected by the victim and 
offender is more likely than a criminal prosecution to be healing for the 
victim and rehabilitative for the offender, there will be countervailing 
considerations, including public safety and the need to achieve systemic 
fairness by treating like cases alike.  The question is which way the balance 
tips in any given case and whether a broad application, including in cases of 
serious, violent crime, can exist outside the jurisdictions of a small number 
of progressive prosecutors who are willing to give restorative justice a try.  
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Ideally, as their experience with restorative justice grows, both mainstream 
prosecutors and the public will be in a better position to answer that question. 
